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The apparent failure of incumbent firms to produce radical innovations is one that 
continues to provoke significant debate in the economic literature. This phenomenon, 
termed the "Incumbent's Curse" by Chandy and Tellis (2000, p.2) receives significant 
support. Rosenbloom and Christensen (1994, p.655) go as far as to say that this is one 
of the "stylised facts" in the innovation literature. The concept of incumbent failure 
to innovate receives support both in theoretic modelling (e.g. Ghemawat 1991, 
Reinganum, 1983) and in empirical case studies (e.g. Christensen 1993, Henderson 
and Clark 1990). Chandy and Tellis (2000) rightly point out however that such 
literature has focused on industries in which there is such incumbent inertia. There are 
well documented examples of leadership in a high profile industry changing with new 
product innovations, e.g. typewriters, computer disks. However, much of the 
literature has been focused on very specialised industries such as photolithographic 
aligners (Henderson and Clark 1990) and private branch exchanges (Ghemawat 
1991). Those opposing the idea of the Incumbent's Curse also have focused on 
particular industries. Chandy and Tellis (2000) used a large sample (64) of products 
in the consumer durables and office product categories in an empirical study. They 
showed that post-1945, the majority of radical product innovations have come from 
large firms and incumbents, thus raising the question of whether the incumbent's 
curse really can be regarded as a general feature of incumbency. 
Clearly the question is one of importance from a policy making perspective. 
Schumpeter (1942) claimed that monopoly was a necessary evil in order to promote 
research and development. The incumbent's curse clearly refutes this view. The 
question of who has the greater incentive to innovate, incumbent or entrant, is key in 
determining competition policy. It is also clear, however, from the literature that 
there is no general solution to this question. Some industries have been characterised 
by a cycle of entrant innovation, subsequent leadership and incumbency, and finally 
usurpation by a new innovating entrant. This is the story told by much of the 











producing radical new innovations: General Electric (fluorescent lamps), Philips 
(compact disc players) and Seiko (analogue quartz watches). Therefore, any attempt 
to produce a model in an attempt to understand the driving factors of product 
innovation must be flexible enough to respond to the characteristics of different 
industries. 
That then is the challenge that this paper sets itself, to produce a model of product 
innovation, in an incumbent - entrant scenario, which removes the vast majority of 
the assumptions made in most models which can be so overpowering as to pre-
determine the result of the analysis. U sing such a model, we may test the sensitivity 
of any assumptions made as well as gaining an insight as to what are the drivers 
behind innovation for an industry. We should then come to a better understanding as 
to why different industries exhibit different research and development patterns. 
Sutton (1998) makes the point that the wide discrepancy of equilibria derived from 
the literature comes not only from industry specific factors, but also the way in which 
the model is set up. There are a variety of ways in which one can set up a model of 
product innovation. Do the players act simultaneously? Are decisions to set up R&D 
programs irreversible? Is it a "winner takes all" patent race? The answers to these 
questions would clearly determine the way in which the model is set up and therefore 
the Nash equilibria derived from the model. This paper began as reflections on the 
model set up by Ghemawat (1991) and so shall use this framework for my analysis. 
That is to say, the game shall be set up as found in the extensive form shown in 
Figures 1 and 2. This shows the players acting simultaneously and irreversibly, 
mcurnng a fixed cost of attempting innovation with an attached probability of 
succeeding. There is a possibility of a duopoly in the new product market. 
The model shall be built in two phases. The first stage, the standard model, includes a 
number of simplifying assumptions. That is, any innovation is drastic, implying 
complete cannibalisation of the old product market. Also the new product market is 
worth exactly the same as the old market. Finally, in the case of duopoly, this is 
perfectly collusive. It shall be shown that a model set up in this way restricts the 
possible Nash equilibria to exclude the possibility of the incumbent firm having 











We shall then move on to expand the model into the variable form, introducing new 
variables for cannibalisation, spillovers!, and incumbent advantage and ferocity of 
competition in a duopoly. The purpose of doing this is that by introducing variables 
in place of assumptions we can examine the sensitivity of the model to the 
assumptions made on the value of these variables. Here, we shall see how 
assumptions of Bertrand price competition in the case of duopoly and no spillovers in 
the secondary product market combined with a viability condition can lead to a 
restriction of the model to a single Nash equilibrium. 
Even after this there are assumptions made regarding the information sets and 
rationality of players that must be tested. The importance of modelling the game as 
one of incomplete information is an important one, as is made clear in the paper. The 
impact of information on the result of the analysis turns out to be significant. It is 
appropriate that we should investigate the impact of an assumption of common 
knowledge as it is an assumption typically made in game theoretic analysis that would 
rightly attract criticism from business practitioners and policy-makers. The 
philosophy behind this paper is to move as far away as possible from the unrealistic 
assumptions often made in order to simplify analysis and to obtain, in so far as it is 
possible, a fuller understanding of the drivers of innovation in situations that are more 
complex than those typically represented in stylised models. 
The avenue opened up by the investigation into a game of incomplete information 
using Bayesian players has been pre-empted by the choice to investigate a static 
game. Clearly, in a game where the players make decisions simultaneously, there can 
be no scope for Bayesian updating. But the aim of this analysis is to clear a path for 
further research. Such research will certainly include looking at a dynamic game 
using conditional probabilities. But before such research can take place we must 
investigate thoroughly a static game of innovation and see what, if anything, can be 
salvaged from such a model and taken on into the dynamic settings. 











Building the model 
Standard model 
We assume two firms, the incumbent I which holds a pre-innovation monopoly, and 
the potential entrant, E which we could assume to be the composite of all potential 
entrants. The cost of research, c is fixed, and the probability of success at innovation 
is p. Thus we could say that the firm can pay c for a p chance of successfully 
innovating. We also assume that p and c are the same for both the incumbent firm 
and the potential entrant. The initial market is worth x in profit to a monopolist. 
However, any innovation is drastic. That is, if an innovation occurs, it reduces the 
value of the earlier market to 0 and the new market becomes worth x. A typical 
example would be computer software, where an updated version completely 
supercedes the old version without necessarily increasing the overall value of the 
market. This combines the no spillovers assumption2 with an assumption regarding 
complete cannibalisation of the initial market. If both firms successfully innovate we 
assume that a duopoly would be perfectly collusive and that each firm would make 
half of the monopoly profit. Both firms choose simultaneously whether to attempt 
innovation and all information about the variables is common knowledge between the 
firms. 
The respective choices of the incumbent and entrant result in the game arriving at one 
of nodes 1 to 4 on the game tree of Figure 1. Nature then determines which, if any, of 
the firms are successful if they have attempted innovation. As each firm will not 
know the end node of the game but are aware of the probabilities involved, we can 
calculate the expected payoffs to each firm at each node. 












Expected payoff to Incumbent: 
Expected payoff to Entrant: 
Node 2: 
Expected payoff to Incumbent: 
E(IJ = p(x-c) +(1- p)(x-c) 
=x-c 
Expected payoff to Entrant: 
Node 3: 
Expected payoff to Incumbent: 
x px 














Expected payoff to Incumbent: 
Expected payoff to Entrant: 
E(E4) = 0 
The choice of the incumbent firm will naturally be dependent on its view of the 
choice of the potential entrant. Clearly it would prefer to be at Node 4 above all 
others. The potential entrant has a dominant strategy not to attempt innovation if 
px - c < o. If this is the case then the Nash equilibrium would be reached at node 4. 
The potential entrant would only attempt innovation if px - c :2 O. If the incumbent 
firm knows this then it then needs to establish whether px - p~x - c :2 O. If this is the 
case then attempting to innovate is a dominant strategy for the potential entrant. 
Therefore the choice for the incumbent depends on the payoffs at nodes 1 and 3. It 
would only choose to attempt to innovate if p~x - px + x - c :2 x - px which would 
lead to a Nash equilibrium at node 1, Otherwise, we have a Nash equilibrium at node 
3. 
If however for the entrant, px - 2 c < 0 and px c ? 0, then it would like to 
choose to attempt innovation only when the incumbent does not and vice versa. In 
other words its payoffs at nodes 2 and 3 are higher than at nodes 1 and 4. 
We can see this by holding the position of the incumbent firm fixed and examining 
the choice of the potential entrant. If we take the opposite position and hold the 
decision of the potential entrant fixed, we can see that if the potential entrant chooses 
not to attempt innovation then the incumbent firm would choose to match this strategy 











was to attempt innovation then the choice of the incumbent would depend on whether 
it had a higher payoff at node 3 than node 1. 
This being so the incumbent would have a dominant strategy not to attempt 
p 2 x 
innovation. This would occur if x - px > -- - px + x - c which implies that 
2 
p 2 x 
-- C < 0 . Knowing this, the potential entrant would choose to innovate as it 
2 
receives a better payoff by doing so and a Nash equilibrium is reached at node 3. 
We may ask what would happen if the incumbent firm faced a higher payoff at node 1 
than node 3. This is actually not possible given the conditions we have set out earlier, 
p 2x 
namely, px c ~ 0 and px 2 - c < O. If the payoff at node 1 was higher than at 
p 2 x 
node 3, this would mean that x - px < -- - px + x - c which implies that 
2 
p2x 
2 - c > O. However, this contradicts the earlier inequalities. This is because 2 
p 2x p 2x 
can never be higher than one half of px and thus for px - 2 - c < 0, c > 2 
which is not consistent with node 1 delivering a higher payoff to the incumbent. 
Therefore we can establish the following summary: 
• If px - c < 0, then the Nash equilibrium is node 4. This is because the potential 
entrant has a dominant strategy to not attempt to innovate. Knowing this the 
incumbent also chooses not to innovate. 
p2x p 2x 
• If px - c ~ 0, px 2 c ~ 0 and 2 - px + x - c ~ x px then the Nash 
equilibrium is at node 1. This is because the potential entrant has a dominant 












p 2x p 2X 
• If px - c ?:. 0, px - c ?:. 0 and - - px + x c < x - px then the Nash 
2 2 
equilibrium is at node 3. This is because although the potential entrant still has a 
dominant strategy to attempt to innovate, the incumbent now chooses not to 
innovate. 
• In the case where px c ?:. 0 and px - p~x - c < 0, the Nash equilibrium is also at 
node 3. The potential entrant does not have a dominant strategy but from the two 
inequalities it follows that 
p 2x 
2 
c>O which implies that 
p 2x 
-- - px + x - c < x - px This means that the incumbent firm has a dominant 2 . 
strategy to not attempt to innovate. Knowing this, the potential entrant chooses to 
innovate. 
There are no other possible situations within the context of this model and so we can 
conclude that mixed strategies are never necessary nor is node 2 ever reached. As 
discussed earlier, this result stems from the constraints we have placed on the model. 
The assumptions made at the start of the model determine the outcome. But this has 
not been a futile exercise. We now have a basis from which we can begin to test the 
sensitivity of the model to specific assumptions. Clearly we would expect a number 
of situations in which there would be a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium and this 
becomes apparent as we develop the model. In order for the model to be useful in 
terms of testing the sensitivity of assumptions it is necessary to introduce new 
variables into the model in place of the assumptions made earlier. Later in this paper 
we shall see how the result derived from this restrictive model is replicated in a less 












Figure 1: Standard Model game tree 
I 
Entrant 
I I N 
Node 2 Chance Node 3 Node 4 











Variable model assuming common knowledge and risk-neutrality 
We shall now adapt the model in order to test the significance of some of the 
assumptions we have made. Two of the variables from the previous model can 
remain, namely, x and c. We can remove the assumption about each firm having the 
same probability of succeeding at innovation by introducing two new variables in 
place of p, namely Pl, the probability that the incumbent will succeed, and P2, the 
probability that the entrant will succeed. 
We can also introduce two new variables that only affect the model if an attempt at 
innovation is successful. A cannibalisation variable, b, replaces the assumption that 
the old market was completely cannibalised by the new product. Now we can say that 
only the proportion b is cannibalised and (I-b) remains. We also assumed that there 
were no spillovers from innovation. That is to say, that the size of the new market 
was precisely the same as the old market in terms of profit. We can remove this 
assumption by introducing the variable s which is the size factor of the new market to 
the old market. If there are positive spillovers from innovation the value of s will be 
greater than 1. The variables b and s are combined so that, given the initial market 
value of x, the value of the market for the new product to a monopolist will be bsx. 
The other assumptions made were about the collusive nature of a duopoly in the new 
market and about the market share between the two firms. We can remove the 
assumption of duopoly profit being equal to monopoly profit by introducing a variable 
d which is the size factor of total profit under a duopoly to monopoly profit. 
Therefore, under a perfectly collusive duopoly, d is equal to 1. If fierce price 
competition were to occur leading to the Bertrand outcome, d would be equal to O. We 
can also introduce a final variable, m, which is the market share of the incumbent firm 
in the new product market if a duopoly occurs. Previously we had assumed that the 
two firms would share the new market equally, i.e. that m was 50%. The market share 











The new game tree in Figure 2 results in the same four nodes being attainable by the 
respective actions of the incumbent and entrant firms. Nature again chooses the final 
outcome and hence we can calculate the expected payoffs to each firm at each node. 
Node 1: 
E[II] = PlP2 (sbdmx c + x(1 b »+ PI (1 P2 Xsbx c + x(l- b» 
+P2(1 PIX-c+x(1 b»+(l PI XI P2XX-C) 
=xb«Plpz(sdm s+I»+(Pl')' PI-P2»+X c 
E[EJ] PIPZ (sbd(l m)x - c) + PI (1- pz)(- c) + P2 (1- Pl)(sbx c) 
+(1-Pl)(l- P2)(- c) 
= PIP2sbd(1-m)x+sbxP2(1- PI) c 
Node 2: 
Node 3: 
E[I3] = P2(x(1 b» + (l-pz)(x) 
= x P2bx 













Through calculating expected payoffs at each node, the incumbent and the potential 
entrant can determine whether either of them have a dominant strategy. If this is the 
case then a Nash equilibrium is reached at one of the four nodes before nature decides 
the final outcome. However, unlike the stage 1 model, there can be occasions in 
which mixed strategies are necessary. If this is the case then the incumbent firm will 
choose to innovate with probability p/ and the entrant will choose to innovate with 
probability pi where the probabilities are given by: 
This model can now form the basis for a sensitivity analysis tool. The methodology 
used to achieve this is a MS ExcelTM spreadsheet that can run this innovation game for 
millions of different scenarios based on the variables we have defined. We will then 
be able to observe the effects that a different level of each variable has on the outcome 
of the game. The exact layout of the spreadsheet written to generate the outcome of 



























Product innovation in a static game of complete information 
Sensitivity of assumptions of market structure and presence of spillovers in the 
secondary product market 
Now that we have a full model we can begin to test the sensitivity of the outcome of 
the game to some of these variables. Here we examine the implications of 
assumptions of Bertrand price competition and no spillovers in the secondary product 
market. We choose these assumptions as they are made in a model developed by 
Pankaj Ghemawat (1997). Thus this section is essentially a case study in analysing 
this particular model. 
We shall also examine a further assumption made by Ghemawat, namely that the only 
possible situations in which the game can occur are those in which either player 
would attempt innovation if they were assured a monopoly in the new product market. 
That is to say the potential rewards from innovation are sufficient to mean that, if 
there was only one player, innovation would be attempted. We shall call this 
"Ghemawat's viability condition". 
Ghemawat's model can be replicated to an extent by translating his assumptions into 
figures for the new variables introduced in the previous section. We are not fully 
replicating Ghemawat's model as we are not using conditional probabilities as he 
does, for reasons discussed previously. Rather we are using the assumptions he 
makes as ones that are typically to be found in game theoretic analysis and observing 
the effects that they would have on our model. He states that, 'any substitution 
between the two generations is one to one in quantities.,3 In other words, he assumes 












Ghemawat also assumes that only a portion of the market is cannibalised by the new 
product. The portion is determined by the difference in price between the two 
products. This is represented in our model by the variable b which can be set between 
0% and 100%. 
Ghemawat also states that if both firms enter the second-generation market, Bertrand 
price competition drives prices down to marginal cost.4 This would usually be 
replicated by setting d equal to O. However he also states that, 'the durable specific 
complements that customers acquired in using firm A's (the incumbent) first-
generation products cannot be applied to either A's or B' s second-generation 
products.,5 This means that there is no advantage to the incumbent in the new market, 
therefore we again would normally set mat 50%. However, Ghemawat also assumes 
that if the incumbent firm were to succeed at innovation at the same time as the 
entrant, the incumbent would shelve the new product as the cannibalisation of the old 
market would be less severe. As there is no profit to be gained in the new market this 
is rational. Thus, in order to replicate these assumptions we must set d as 1 and m as 
0%. That is to say, there are profits to be made in the duopoly scenario but the 
incumbent makes none of them. 
Ghemawat's fixed costs of attempting innovation are given as c and we set p J equal to 
P2 as the probabilities of the two firms succeeding at innovation are the same.6 Given 
that we hold x, the size of the market, constant at 100, we can see that there are 3 
variables to be considered, p, c and b. All of the others are held fixed. 
For the analysis we shall set b, the cannibalisation variable at 100%, thus giving the 
incumbent the most incentive to innovate. The reason for this is that the traditional 
result of the analysis shows that the incumbent will not innovate. By setting b to 
100% we are giving the incumbent the maximum possible incentive to innovate. If 
the result remains the same then this will demonstrate even more clearly how strong 














conditions7 we can see from Figure 3 that under 'viable' values of p and c (signified 
by V in Figure 38), the game will always have a Nash Equilibrium at Node 3. Even 
when the cost of attempting to innovate is 0, the incumbent will still not attempt 
innovation as his expected payoff at node 1 will be the same as at node 3. Thus it has 
a weakly dominant strategy not to innovate. 
This is clear by looking at the expected payoffs for the incumbent at the various 
nodes. As d is 0, there is no difference between sharing the new market and having it 
completely cannibalised by the entrant. Any decrease in the amount of the market to 
be cannibalised merely reduces the incentive to innovate still further for the 
incumbent. As there are no spillovers, node 2 can never be better than node 1 for the 
incumbent. Also, as dis 0, node 1 can never be better than node 3. Therefore the 
incumbent will never attempt innovation. 
Also, for the entrant, there is a dominant strategy to attempt innovation, regardless of 
the values of c and p. This is because the entrant's expected payoffs at nodes 1 and 3 
are always positive and thus a better option than staying out of the market. Therefore, 
if we were to assume these viability conditions, on top of the assumptions regarding 
spillovers and market structure, our model would be forced to produce the same 
outcome whatever the values of our variables. 
For our analysis of the sensitivity of the model to the assumptions regarding spillovers 
and Bertrand price competition we shall reset M to 50%, assuming that neither firm 
has an advantage in the new market. This is not a restrictive assumption. It is simply 
that we have no information regarding the nature of the second prodcut market and 
thus should not assume an advantage to either player. 
We must vary d, the variable that represents the ferocity of competition in the new 
market to observe the sensitivity of the model to the Bertrand assumption. In the 
7p.133, TIA(E,O) TI)O,O» y 
TIB(CO,E) > . -,-F-=-B_-.,.. 
rnm(zl,z2,Z3) 
8 
These tables are generated by the MS Excel spreadsheet that calculates the outcome of the game for 











same way we can vary values of s to observe the sensitivity of the model to the 
assumption of no spillovers. We set c to 0, a situation in which node 3 is reached and 
the incumbent firm is indifferent about attempting innovation, and examine the effects 
of varying sand d. We can see, from Figure 4, that these have a significant effect on 
the decision of the incumbent firm. 
Obviously, the cost of attempting innovation would not be zero in reality. However, 
we know what the effect of a positive cost would be, namely that more profit would 
be required to justify incurring it. By setting it to zero we simply are removing its 
influence from the analysis and this allows us to see the effects of movements in sand 
d more clearly. 
From Figure 4 we can see that in this situation, although the entrant has a dominant 
strategy to innovate, the strategy of the incumbent is sensitive to s and d. When the 
fixed costs of attempting innovation are zero, we can see than any positive spillovers 
whatsoever result in the incumbent attempting innovation, even if we continue to hold 
the assumption that profit in the duopoly market is zero. 
Also if we maintain that there are no spillovers then the existence of any positive 
profit in the new product duopoly scenario is sufficient to lead the incumbent firm to 
attempt innovation. As the cost of attempting increases then the model naturally 
becomes less sensitive as the incumbent requires ever more incentive to attempt 
innovation. 
This is a clear illustration of the importance of testing the significance of assumptions 
made in a game theoretic model. In this case the assumptions were powerful enough 
to ensure that the outcome of the game was fixed regardless of the level of the other 











Figure 3 Ghemawat's Viability Condition 
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Figure 4 : Sensitivity to market structure and spillovers 
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Figure 5: Summary of results of relaxation of assumptions 
Assumptions made Incumbent Entrant Possible 
NodeN.E. 
Viability Conditions, no Never attempts innovation Always attempts innovation 3 
spillovers, Bertrand 
price competition 
Remove Viability Never attempts innovation Sometimes attempts 3,4 
condition innovation 
Also remove no Sometimes attempts Sometimes attempts 1,2,3,or4 
spillovers and Bertrand innovation innovation 
assumptions 
As we would expect, as the assumptions regarding the context in which the game is 











Product Innovation in a static game of incomplete information 
Significance of assumptions of common knowledge and risk-neutrality 
In the previous section, we were able to remove the majority of any assumptions made 
in the standard model by replacing them with variables and we were then able to 
examine the effects of the various levels of these variables. However, that is not to 
say that no assumptions have been made. We have thus far made the assumption that 
all of the variables in the model are common knowledge between the players, as is the 
rationality of the players. The other assumption we have made is that the players are 
risk-neutral - that is, their utility functions are linear with the distribution of Mother 
Nature's acts. Now if the common knowledge assumptions hold, the risk-neutrality 
assumption is not significant. This is because each player can fully predict the 
decision of the other and hence the strategic decision is simply to maximise the 
expected payoff, given this decision. Attitude to risk under these conditions is 
irrelevant. All of the decisions lead to a lottery as the outcome. There is no 
opportunity to take a guaranteed payoff in place of a lottery which generates an equal 
expected payoff 
If one of the common knowledge assumptions is relaxed (we shall see that it does not 
matter which), the assumption of risk-neutrality becomes more significant. This is 
because if the players cannot fully predict the decision of the other player, they must 
each consider the worst case scenario when the action of the other player serves to 
minimise their expected payoff Which of the common knowledge assumptions that 
is relaxed is irrelevant. The key here is that each player cannot fully predict the action 
of the other player. If rationality is not common knowledge then there is the 
possibility that the other player will choose a dominated strategy. Similarly, if the 
values of the variables are not common knowledge then there is the possibility that the 
other player will calculate a different scenario and will thus choose what the player 
considers to be a dominated strategy whether rationality is common knowledge or not. 
Thus it only takes a very small degree of uncertainty to make the risk-neutrality 











seem that an assumption of common knowledge over the value of all the variables is 
highly optimistic. 
We must then consider what the impact of removing the risk-neutrality assumption is. 
We are not referring to risk-neutrality or aversion in the traditional sense. The choice 
here is still between lotteries, there is no possibility of a guaranteed payoff. What we 
are trying to consider here is how players will react if there is the possibility that 
players might find themselves with a far worse lottery than their reasoning based on 
mutual knowledge of full rationality would predict for those reasons outlined earlier. 
A more sensible reflection of risk-averse players would be to consider what would 
occur if the players were each to playa strategy similar to a security strategy.9 That is 
to say, they were to assume that the choice of the other player would minimise their 
payoff given their own decision. 
We must clarify here the level of information available to each player. Neither player 
is aware of the strategy of the other player. Each player has the same information 
regarding the values of the variables, however they do not know what the other player 
believes them to be. Therefore they cannot predict the decision of the other player. 
Thus the strategic decision of each player now is to assume that whatever their 
decision, they will secure the worst possible expected payoff in the set of vectors 
consistent with that decision (not the worst possible result; this would be to assume 
that nature is also against them), and they must act to maximise their expected payoff, 
given this assumption. This is are-iteration of the concept ofa security strategy. 
9 TIlls is not literally a security strategy as the removal of the no spillovers assumption means that this 
is no longer a zero-sum game. However, the principle is the same. The players seek to protect 











Secnrity strategies in prodnct innovation 
We have therefore determined that players, faced with conditions of uncertainty, shall 
base their strategic decision on the assumption that the other player will be trying to 
enter the new product market. The impact of using the security strategy in the product 
innovation game is significant in determining the relative incentives for innovation 
between the incumbent and the entrant. The question of who has the greater incentive 
to innovate is central to the concept of the Incumbent's Curse. 
In calculating the respective incentives to innovate we simply use the formula 'what 
you get if you do minus what you get if you don't'. Clearly if you receive a higher 
expected payoff from attempting innovation than from not attempting, you will 
attempt innovation. In order to see the impact of risk aversion on innovation incentive 
we must compare the two different sets of incentives. 
Rational players with complete information 
Incumbent: 
Entrant: 
[P(sbx c + (1 b)x) + (1- pXx - c)]- x 













Therefore, looking at the players in isolation, the entrant will always have a greater 
incentive to innovate than the incumbent will by a factor of pbx. It is this result that 
drives the theory of the incumbent's curse. Although the incumbent may well have a 
positive incentive to innovate, the entrant will always have a greater incentive. From 
the point of view of our game theoretic model, this means that node 2, where the 
incumbent attempts and the entrant does not, can never be reached as this would 
imply that the incumbent had an incentive to innovate in a situation where the entrant 
did not. This was an impossible scenario under the assumptions of rationality and 
complete information. 
Indeed this is a similar result to that derived from the standard model discussed 
earlier. This model contained only three variables, p,c and x, and carried some very 
restrictive assumptions. Within this model, reaching node 2 was also impossible. But 
even after removing the majority of these assumptions, we find that although this 
would be expected to free up the model to a large extent, the assumptions of common 
knowledge and complete information delivers the same result. That is, that Node 2 
can never be reached. 
If these assumptions are removed, players opt for a security strategy as previously 
discussed. This means that players assume that the other player will attempt 
innovation. Thus incentives are calculated by the expected payoffs obtained at the 
respective nodes of the game where the other player has attempted innovation. These 
are nodes 1 and 3 in the case of the incumbent and nodes 1 and 2 in the case of the 
entrant. This has profound effects on the incentives for innovation. 
Risk-averse players with incomplete information 
Incumbent: 
(II IJ 
= p 2 smbdx + p 2 sbx + 2p2 bx + psbx - pbx + p 2 c p 2 x + px-c P 
Entrant: 
(E, E2 ) 











In this case the players consider that they will find themselves at an end node in which 
the other player is attempting innovation. As a result, in calculating incentive to 
innovate, they must decide between the lotteries to be found at the respective end 
nodes. In the case of the incumbent these are II and h, and in the case of the entrant, 
E1 and E2. Clearly, under these conditions, it is not the case that the potential entrant 
will always have a greater incentive to innovate than the incumbent as we cannot say 
with certainty whether one incentive is larger than the otheL Who will have the 
greater incentive will depend on the values of the respective variables that 
characterise the industry in question. 
This means that we have finally broken free of the constraint on the model over the 
possibility that the incumbent may have a greater incentive to innovate that the 
entrant. We are not trying to pre-determine the outcome of the model here. Making a 
Nash Equilibrium at Node 2 possible is not prejudicing our investigation. It is the fact 
that, if possible Nash equilibria are closed off by our restrictive assumptions, we 
cannot with confidence proceed to an investigation of which variables drive 
innovation. 
Types of Innovation 
We are therefore free to continue our investigation into the causes of innovation. We 
know that all Nash equilibria are potentially possible. Now the question must be what 
vectors of the set variables deliver which outcome. Now that we have identified the 
fact that the characteristics of the industry will determine the respective incentives of 
the players, and therefore potentially the resultant innovator, we must examine a range 
of scenarios which might be said to be reflective of the types of innovation observed. 
Innovation is often split into two classes, radical and incrementaL Radical innovation 
significantly changes the product and the consumption pattern of consumers. 
Incremental innovation has a markedly smaller effect on the product and therefore 
consumption behaviour. Henderson and Clark (1990, p.9) argue that "the 











misleading and does not account for the sometimes disastrous effects on industry 
incumbents of seemingly minor improvements in technological products." They refer 
to the concept of architectural innovation which can be defined as changing the 
"architecture of the product without changing its components." This concept is quite 
industry-specific in that it refers generally to products of a technological nature. 
However, Henderson and Clark claim that such a type of innovation offers another 
way for entrants to steal ahead of inert incumbent firms. 
In terms of an investigation into the possible existence of an Incumbent's Curse 
however, this is of limited interest. If an innovation could be done easily and would 
cannibalise the old market significantly then firms would clearly go ahead and do it. 
Thus we would expect a Nash equilibrium of Node 1 in most cases of architectural 
innovation. It is possible that an incumbent would shelve such an innovation if they 
were successful, given low spillovers or high cannibalisation, but they would still 
attempt. The aim of this paper is to develop insights into the factors that drive 
innovation attempts. An investigation into situations that always lead to attempts 
would not be of interest. 
Incremental innovation 
We must ask, what are the features that one might expect to see when incremental 
innovation is being attempted? Given that incremental innovation is a minor change 
to an existing product, we would expect the probability of success in such an 
enterprise to be very high for the incumbent firm, which manufactures the existing 
product. From the entrant's perspective, the probability of success would not be as 
high, given that the entrant will attach wider interval spreads to its estimates of the 
efficacy of technologies in building a new product than will the incumbent in 
improving an existing one. In essence we are assuming the existence of some 
advantages of 'learning by doing'. Therefore, in the terms of our model we would 
expect PI to be high and P2 to be lower than P 1. 
Also, as the change in the product is not extensive, we would not expect this new 




















































variable, b, would be low10 . If b were to be high then we would be considering a case 
of architectural innovation. The cost of attempting innovation would also not be 
particularly high given the nature of the innovation, thus c is also low. Therefore, in 
the case of incremental innovation with x remaining fixed at 100, we have three 
variables that are industry-specific, s, m and d. 
We shall assume that d, the proportion of monopoly profit made in a duopoly scenario 
shall be 70%. This assumes therefore that there is some competition in a duopoly 
scenario but certainly not as severe as Bertrand competition. This therefore leaves us 
with two variables, sand m that will determine the outcome of the game. 
Figure 6 : Who has the greater incentive? The case of incremental innovation. 
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10 Clearly any selection of these variables, without having a particular case in mind, will be arbitrary to 























Figure 6 shows when the respective players have the greater incentive to attempt 
incremental innovation, given the variables defined. Not all of these situations are 
necessarily feasible however. It is unlikely that the value of s will be less than 1 as 
this would indicate that the market for the new product is less lucrative than the old 
market. Given that this is an improvement to the product it would seem strange. It is 
also unlikely, given the fact that this is an incremental innovation, that the level of m, 
the market share of the incumbent in the event of a duopoly, will be less than 50%. If 
anything, a more sensible assumption would be that it is significantly higher than 
50%. However, just with these very undemanding assumptions, we can see that the 
incumbent will nearly always have a greater incentive to innovate incrementally than 
the entrant. 
It would be a grave mistake however to conclude from this that we would expect to 
see very few incremental innovations from entrants. Although the relative incentives 
offer some insight, yet more understanding can be obtained from looking at the 
outcomes of the game at these variables. Simply because one firm may have more 
incentive than another does not mean that one will attempt innovation whilst the other 
does not. 
From Figure 7 it becomes clear that unless the market share of the incumbent in the 
new product market is very high, it is possible that the entrant will also attempt 
incremental innovation, even though it has less incentive to do so than the incumbent. 
Whether this will be the case will rely on the respective levels of m and s. This 
highlights the importance of not making general conclusions regarding innovation. In 
this situation it is highly uncertain whether the outcome of the game will be at node 
1,2,3, or 4. All outcomes are possible. Therefore, the entrant mayor may not attempt 
innovation according to the value of m, the market share of the incumbent in the event 
of a duopoly in the secondary product market. This could be considered to represent 
the strength of the brand of the incumbent. If it is too strong it acts as a disincentive 
to entrants to innovate. Also, the value of s, spillovers, will influence the decisions of 












Figure 7 : Game outcomes. The case of incremental innovation. 
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Radical Innovation 
The second type of innovation we shall discuss is radical innovation. This is defined 
as a new product that significantly cannibalises the original product market. Such a 
type of innovation would be characterised by different levels of variables than 
incremental innovation. There is no a priori reason to assume that an incumbent 
would have an advantage in research and development of this type. Thus we shall 
hold p 1 and P2 to be equal to each other. Also, we would expect the levels of p 1 and P2 











to be high for the same reason. 11 Once again we shall arbitrarily set d to be 70%. The 
cost of innovation, c, will be slightly higher than in the case of incremental 
innovation. 
Thus, once again we are left with two industry-specific variables, s and m. The 
effects of these variables on the incentives for radical innovation can be seen in Figure 
8. Clearly in all situations, given these variables, the entrant has a greater incentive to 
innovate than the incumbent does. There are no levels of sand m that give the 
incumbent firm a greater incentive to innovate than the entrant. Is this then evidence 
for the existence of the incumbent's curse? Certainly there will be no circumstances 
in which the incumbent has an incentive to innovate and the entrant does not. But to 
fully understand the factors behind a drastic innovation we must once again look at 
the outcome of the game in this situation. 
The outcome of the game in the same situation as above can be seen in Figure 8. 
From this it is clear that, although the entrant will always have more incentive to 
innovate, there are many situations in which the Nash equilibrium is at Node 1 rather 
than Node 3, that is to say, both firms attempt innovation. Indeed, we can see from 
Figure 9 that the outcome of the game is sensitive to the level of s rather than the level 
of m. Therefore we can conclude that if the level of spillovers is high enough then 
both the entrant and the incumbent will attempt innovation. That is to say, the 
incumbent's curse is only valid if spillovers are low. 
11 Once again we shall choose arbitrary levels for these variables. We shall use PI = P2 = 20% and b 











Figure 8: Who has the most incentive? The case of drastic innovation 
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Figure 9: Game outcomes. The case of drastic innovation. 
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We must ensure that this result holds for a greater range of scenarios than the arbitrary 
one we have just examined. If we examine the impact of the level of spillovers on the 
incumbent's curse over a range of values of p and b then we shall obtain a clearer 
conclusion as to the validity of this result. 
The incumbent's curse has been defined as a scenario in which the entrant attempts 
innovation and the incumbent does not. We have seen that this occurrence is sensitive 
to the level of spillovers. Figures 10 and 11 show the level of spillovers against the 
levels of p and b, which may be regarded as a measure of the degree that the 
innovation is drastic. The more drastic the innovation the higher we might expect the 
level of b and the lower the level of p. Therefore, from looking at the impact of 
spillovers over a range of these values, it is clear that the incumbent's curse is very 
much subject to the level of spillovers. Indeed, if spillovers are high, there is only a 
very small range of drastic innovations in which the incumbent's curse will occur. 
Figure 10: Game outcomes for levels of spillovers and cannibalisation where 
p=20% 
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Figure 11: Game outcomes for levels of spillovers and p where b=60% 
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Obviously, the data shown in Figures 10 and 11 are subject to the respective fixed 
levels of p and b chosen. In Figure 10 we can see that as b increases then less 
spillovers are required for the incumbent to attempt innovation, i.e. Node 1 becomes 
the Nash equilibrium at lower levels of s. In Figure 11, we can see that as p increases 
the lower the levels of spillovers are required for the incumbent to attempt innovation. 
This is not unexpected, as the chances of success increase and as the cannibalisation 
of the old market increases, one would expect the incumbent to attempt innovation. 
The key conclusion that may be drawn from this analysis is that, for drastic 
innovations, the incumbent's curse is only valid under a limited range of situations. 
The respective levels of both p and b define those situations and the range of these 
situations reduces as the level of spillovers increases. 
Therefore returning to the earlier section regarding the significance of the no 
spillovers assumption we can see that not only is a model sensitive to such an 
assumption but that spillovers can drive the entire argument against the existence of 
the incumbent's curse. Namely, if spillovers are high enough then the incumbent will 
attempt innovation, regardless of the levels of the other variables. 
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We are not concluding here that the incumbent's curse does not exist, nor that an 
incumbent disinclination to innovate does. The aim of this paper was to reconcile the 
respective schools of thought and to gain an insight as to why two such different 
conclusions can be reached. The answer is clear. First, the incumbent's curse, if it 
does exist, only does so for drastic innovations. Secondly, it only exists in a range of 
scenarios. Therefore, it is no surprise that some industries should exhibit evidence of 
an incumbent's curse whilst others may not. Equally important is the point that 
observed evidence of innovation should not be translated into a conclusion on 
innovation incentives. One could observe a series of entrants making drastic 
innovations that would still be totally consistent with the notion that there is no 
incumbent's curse in that industry. This is because of the stochastic innovation 
process that allows for the possibility of a failed attempt by the incumbent. This is an 












This paper set out to investigate those factors that drive innovation in industries. It 
did not set out to examine a particular industry nor did it seek to obtain a generalised 
result regarding the effect of market structure on innovation. It therefore comes as no 
surprise that in a project that sought to escape the restrictions placed by assumptions a 
model, the result is highly equivocal. That is to say, we cannot make a blanket 
statement with regard to the existence or otherwise of an Incumbent's Curse. In a 
sense, that is precisely what this paper set out to achieve. As discussed at the 
beginning of the investigation, the fact that there is a controversy over the notion, with 
both sides producing examples of industries as evidence indicates that it would be 
wrong to attempt to reach a definitive conclusion. The philosophical angle of this 
investigation was to allow as much flexibility as possible in the model. This has led 
us to develop a model of innovation that, within the constraints we placed upon the 
exercise, allows us to look at a range of scenarios and determine what are the factors 
that cause different innovation profiles in different industries. The result of this 
investigation was that, in the case of drastic innovation, the main driving factor behind 
whether an industry exhibited an Incumbent's Curse was the level of spillovers. 
Some further interesting conclusions to be drawn from this paper relate to the strength 
of the assumptions regarding common knowledge and rationality. The paper began 
by building a very simple model of product innovation which contained a number of 
severely restricting assumptions on the environment in which the game took place. 
However, when we removed all of these assumptions and replaced them with 
variables, we found that the same result occurred. That is, Node 2 was not possible as 
a Nash Equilibrium. This result only disappeared when the assumptions regarding 
common knowledge and mutual knowledge of rationality were removed. It was only 
then that we were able to conduct an investigation into the sensitivity of the game to 
the respective variables. 
The further result of this investigation is that it has now set up an opportunity for 
further detailed research into a dynamic model of innovation using conditional 











or no significance to the derivation of the Nash equilibria means that under a dynamic 
framework we can now ask to what extent an attempt at innovation is a signal to the 
level of spillovers. An incumbent firm, even if facing an incentive to attempt 
innovation must consider whether, in so doing, it is signalling to an entrant that 
spillovers are high and that they should also be attempting innovation. 
Perhaps the key result of this paper has been the demonstration of the power of 
assumptions typically made in game theoretic models. Sutton's point that the model 
can be set up in many ways is valid. But to some extent this is resolved when case-
specific models are developed. Such a model should be set up to reflect the situation 
it attempts to replicate, something a general model cannot do. But beyond this there 
are assumptions made in the way the Nash equilibria within these models are reached. 
It is these that this paper has shown to be at least as significant as the way in which 
the model is set up. 
It is too easy for models, especially those which seek to explain a historical case, to 
start backwards from the result. That is to say, if the model must explain an 
occurrence of entrant innovation then the temptation to introduce assumptions that 
simplify the mathematical features of the model is significant. Certainly when these 
assumptions lead the model to a conclusion in line with the case study it seeks to 
explain, there is a temptation to ignore the fact that such assumptions could be driving 
the result of the model. This paper has demonstrated these dangers and has, by 
attempting to avoid these same traps, concluded that the level of spillovers is a major 
driver for innovation in a static framework. This has therefore opened a path into 
investigation of a dynamic framework in which the signalling effects of innovation 
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